Continued from part 1 ...
170 Mandates
The debate regained urgency in March 2001, when a Thai Airways International jet exploded while parked at a gate in Bangkok, killing one flight attendant. Investigators determined that hot weather and prolonged use of air-conditioning systems located under a sparsely filled center fuel tank had heated volatile vapors. These were touched off by a spark from a fuel pump.
That summer, determined to attack the problem without ordering a sweeping retrofit, then-FAA Administrator Jane Garvey said it was "time for a new approach." She called for more frequent inspections and upgrades to wiring, pumps and other electrical systems. By targeting ignition points, the program eventually grew to some 170 specific mandates to reduce potential explosion risks.
Industry leaders reluctantly supported the drive. But it soon became clear that the repetitive wiring checks and modifications, while cheaper than installing nitrogen systems, could cost the industry hundreds of millions of dollars. The number of potential ignition sources "stunned me beyond belief," says John Hickey, the FAA's point man on aircraft certification.
Despite industry howls against additional costs, Mr. Hickey ordered FAA researchers to keep looking for a fail-safe solution. In late 2002, with Boeing's support, FAA scientists unveiled a prototype nitrogen-generating system that would cost a fraction of earlier proposed versions. After flight tests in 2003, airlines gave the 200-pound system good reviews, saying it wouldn't reduce fuel efficiency.
In early 2004, then-FAA chief Marion Blakey announced she would propose retrofit rules affecting roughly 3,800 aircraft. That was followed by more than a year of consensus-building within the 45,000-person agency. In late 2005, the FAA chief released a formal proposal covering about 3,200 aircraft. Its projected cost to airlines came to roughly $250,000 per plane over decades of operation.
European plane-manufacturer Airbus has opposed the plan, arguing its jets are less susceptible than Boeing planes to tank explosions. The Department of Transportation and the White House Office of Management and Budget -- which is still reviewing the proposal -- challenged whether the benefits would be worth the cost.
The agency's deliberations have been further hampered by personnel shifts. The FAA has been run by an acting chief for about a year -- Mr. Sturgell, a Republican, has been caught up in partisan election-year skirmishes -- making it harder for the agency to push expensive safety programs.
Though airline resistance continues, the FAA's mandate for new fuel-tank devices is slated for release as early as July. It is expected to cover about 1,000 fewer aircraft than were in initial proposals.
Meanwhile, market forces have generated other solutions. Boeing, an early opponent of nitrogen-inerting devices, more than a year ago made them optional on certain planes but found no takers. Boeing is now poised, on its own, to start making the technology standard equipment on new aircraft, beginning with twin-engine 737s before the end of the year. The manufacturer won't disclose costs.
Most Wanted
The fuel-tank issue has a near-permanent place on the list of "Most Wanted" transport-safety dangers the National Transportation Safety Board compiles each year. Another issue that has been a fixture on the NTSB's Top 10 list since 1990 is the specter of runway collisions.
Runway incursions -- close calls between taxiing aircraft and those landing or taking off -- are among the top safety concerns in the U.S. and internationally. As air traffic soared and airports grew busier, the number of close calls ticked upward in the late 1990s before jumping nearly 25%, to 405, in the year ending September 2000.
"That is the thing that keeps me up at night," says NTSB chairman Mark Rosenker.
In 2000, many domestic airports -- even the largest -- lacked special programs or equipment to guard against collisions. Afterward, the FAA moved aggressively to establish regional runway safety offices that worked with airports to add improved signs and lighting on runways and taxiways. The agency advocated development of ground radars that could alert controllers of potential incursions. It also studied risks at individual fields, even supporting bans on jets being towed without escort vehicles at Los Angeles International Airport.
By the 2003 fiscal year, the number of near-misses dropped to 323, a level seen in the late-1990s. But the successes were fleeting. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, by mid-2007 the FAA had cut its runway-safety office staff by almost half, to 37. The office went without a permanent director for more than two years.
Currently, only 12 airports have received ground radars, out of an initial target of 35. Early models were seen as unreliable: Agency and industry officials say air-traffic controllers sometimes disregarded or turned them off to avoid distractions from false alerts during thunderstorms or other low-visibility times -- exactly the conditions when technology is most needed.
"In recent years, the FAA's Office of Runway Safety has not been fulfilling its mission," the GAO said in a report last November. "The absence of coordination and national leadership impedes further progress."
Mr. Sturgell counters that the FAA accelerated industry efforts with a 2007 "call to action." The agency, he says, "wants to move the chains forward" by studying why pilots and controllers make mistakes and employing readily available technology, including ####pit displays and computer-controlled ground lighting to warn crews when runways are in use.
Nonetheless, late last year the rate of serious incursions per million flights jumped fourfold from a year earlier, indicating that pilots and controllers once again were "starting to get a bit complacent," says Henry "Hank" Krakowski, the FAA's top traffic control official. Top FAA officials contacted airline CEOs, he says, to "crank up the attention to the highest accountable level."
Since then, the rate of serious incidents has declined. But even some FAA stalwarts say the agency's overall system of cooperation is under siege. "Trust has broken down between the FAA's work force and the airlines," says Tony Broderick, a former high-ranking agency official who is now an industry consultant. In light of the congressional and public uproar over the FAA's recent enforcement missteps, Mr. Broderick says: "It's hard to informally talk about dealing with problems, when everybody is scared to death about being investigated."
Holding Pattern; Safety Pushes Stall at Embattled FAA. (Part 2 of 2)
